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itly excluded sunbathing activities and placing beach chairs and other
paraphernalia within the foreshore. Mrs. Bubis appealed to the Superior Court of NewJersey, Appellate Division (the "court").
The court began its analysis by restating that privately owned
oceanfront property only extends to the high water mark. The State
owns the foreshore in trust for its citizens. The court then emphasized
that the public's right to use property held in trust extends to recreational uses regardless of the property owner. From this, the court concluded that although a private party that owns the property above the
high water mark may regulate the use of the foreshore for safety purposes, that private party may not limit use of the foreshore merely to
enhance the enjoyment of their own property. Thus, the Kassins violated Mrs. Bubis' rights when their lifeguard directed her to move her
beach chair so that the Kassins' view would remain unobstructed.
The court then stated that the Public Trust Doctrine may require a
right of public access to a privately-owned area. Relying on Mathews v.
Bay Head Improvement Ass'n the court reiterated the four factors to be
considered: (1) the location of the dry sand area in relation to the
foreshore; (2) the extent and availability of publicly-owned upland
sand area; (3) the nature and extent of the public demand for beach
access; and (4) the usage of the upland by the owner as a commercial
or business enterprise. The court applied these factors and determined that the public did not deserve a right to access the Kassins' upland property. First, the court reasoned that a publicly owned upland
sand area is readily available in the property adjacent to the Kassins'.
Second, the court noted that the adjacent publicly owned beach satisfied the public demand for beach access. Finally, and most notably,
the court found that the Kassins did not use their property to conduct
a business enterprise and thus the government could not create a right
of public access without paying just compensation. Thus, Mrs. Bubis
and the public may recreate and sunbathe within the foreshore, but
Mrs. Bubis and the public may not use the Kassins' property under the
Public Trust Doctrine.
Ultimately, the court reversed the trial court as to the limitations
imposed on the use of the foreshore, but affirmed the limitations imposed on the use of the Kassins' private property.
Cody Doig
TEXAS
City of Del Rio v. Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust, 269 S.W.3d 613
(Tex. App. 2008) (affirming the district court's holding that a landowner may reserve groundwater rights from the conveyance of a surface estate, and that the rule of capture will not permit appropriation
of otherwise validly severed groundwater rights).
The Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust ("Hamilton Trust") owns a
3,200-acre ranch in Val Verde County, Texas. The ranch lies above
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part of the Edwards-Trinity Aquifer groundwater formation. In 1997,
Hamilton Trust sold fifteen acres of the ranch to the City of Del Rio
("City"), but reserved from the conveyance all water rights associated
with the tract. Despite this reservation, in the summer of 2002, the City
drilled and completed a water well on the fifteen-acre tract to augment
its municipal drinking water supply. Shortly thereafter, Hamilton
Trust filed suit against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that it
owned the groundwater beneath the fifteen-acre tract. In response,
the City filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that Hamilton
Trust's reservation was invalid as to groundwater, and asserting its own
claim of ownership to any groundwater pumped to the surface. The
83rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, concluded that the water rights reservation was valid and enforceable as to the groundwater
rights, and that ownership of the groundwater rights beneath the fifteen-acre tract belonged to the Trust. The City appealed to the Court
of Appeals of Texas.
The City's primary argument was that pursuant to the rule of capture, one can only achieve ownership of groundwater if the groundwater is reduced to possession. In addition, the City argued that the absolute ownership doctrine fuirther supported its position that ownership
of groundwater only referred to a right of the surface estate to acquire
possession of the water, not to the groundwater itself. The City reasoned that because the Hamilton Trust only reserved a right to acquire
possession of the groundwater beneath the fifteen-acre tract, and because the City never developed the groundwater, thereby reducing it to
possession, its claims of ownership were invalid. The court held that
the City had confused the separate and distinct concepts of the absolute ownership theory and the rule of capture.
Citing the Texas Supreme Court, the court held that groundwater
is a part of and no different from the soil, and the landowner is the
absolute owner of it. The court continued that under the absolute
ownership theory, groundwater is the exclusive property of the surface
owner, and is as subject to sale or reservation as any other species of
property. As such, the Trust was entitled to sever and reserve the
groundwater from the surface conveyance to the City. The court went
on to explain that the rule of capture does not confer an affirmative
right to drain property from beneath a neighbor's tract; rather, it denies judicial remedy to a landowner whose neighbor is draining
groundwater beneath the landowner's property. As applied, the court
held that if the City owned the groundwater beneath the fifteen-acre
tract and began developing it, the Hamilton Trust would have no judicial remedy for drainage from beneath its own ranch. However, because Hamilton Trust validly reserved the groundwater rights, the City
did not own the groundwater and could not rely on the rule of capture.
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A second argument of the City contended that Hamilton Trust's
groundwater reservation violated the Texas Constitution's prohibition
against the establishments of perpetuities, but the court quickly dismissed the argument. The City argued that because the Hamilton
Trust failed to reserve access rights to the fifteen-acre tract, and
thereby a means of reaching the groundwater, the severance of the
groundwater rights would result in permanent alienation of the water
resource, in contravention of public policy. Dismissing this argument,
the court pointed out that Hamilton Trust would not need access to
the fifteen-acre tract to pump the groundwater from beneath it. Hamilton Trust may access the groundwater from its own adjacent ranch,
and as a result, the reservation does not violate the Texas Constitution's prohibition against perpetuities.
For the foregoing reasons, the court affirmed the district court ruling, holding that Hamilton Trust validly reserved groundwater rights,
and the City could not continue pumping groundwater from its fifteenacre tract.
Jeff McGaughran
Guitar Holding Co. v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 263 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. 2008) (holding that water districts, when promulgating rules according to the Texas Water Code's
goal of maintaining historic use, must consider both the amount of
water historically used and the water's historical purpose).
Texas established groundwater conservation districts to manage the
state's groundwater. These districts have broad authority to develop a
management plan to conserve and protect groundwater within that
district. The Texas Water Code ("Code") mandates the districts consider all types of groundwater uses and needs to develop fair and impartial rules. However, when enacting rules limiting use, a district may
prioritize existing rights by safeguarding historic uses.
Due to inefficient planning and an arid climate, Hudspeth County
Underground Water Conservation District No. 1 ("District") revamped
its groundwater management plan. The new plan detailed three types
of permits: (1) validation permits, (2) operating permits, and (3) transfer permits. The District granted validation permits to well users who
had permits before the District promulgated this new plan. These
permits entitled those users to withdraw three to four acre-feet per year
for every acre irrigated during a designated historic period. If the user
could not obtain a validation permit, the landowner could then apply
for an operating permit. This permit calculated water use based on
surface acreage, but operating permit holders could only extract water
when the aquifer's water table reached a certain elevation. So, unlike
the validation permit, which guaranteed a water right, an operating
permit only granted water access during certain conditions. Finally,
both validation and operation permit holders could apply for transfer

